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PREFACE 
In the coming years the world will be undergoing a major structural 
transformation as the size, composition, and geographic distri- 
bution of industry changes under the influence of: 
o increases in factor prizes: energy, labor; 
o depletion of resources: minerals, cheap liquid fuels; 
o changes in technology: microelectronics, biotechnology; 
o industrialization of the LDCs. 
The already-industrialized nations, whose industrial structure 
was shaped by relatively inexpensive energy and easy access 
to resources, will find certain sectors losing competitiveness 
to newly-industrialized nations with access to similar technolo- 
gies, and cheaper labor. The newly-industrializing nations will 
strive to increase their portion of the global industrial pie, 
while the industrialized nations will compete with each other 
to preserve their shares. At the same time, population increase 
and economic development will place new demands both for 
employment and for goods on the industrial system. 
At the national level, this transformation will affect economic 
growth, employment, regional development, balance of payments, 
R&D, and many other sensitive constituents of national well-being. 
For the small economies that have a relatively large foreign trade 
sector, the transformation can be traumatic. Even the large, 
autarkic economies will face substantial challenges. 
IIASA is now beginning an exploration of the role that it might 
play in analyzing and improving understanding of the global 
and national issues arising from this transformation of the inter- 
national industrial structure. One part of the exploration has 
iii 
been the commissioning of a series of papers by outside specialists. 
A central question for all nations in the face of the industrial 
transformation is: what strategy should be followed to maximize 
the prospects of national well-being, given the anticipated 
changes? The second paper in the series addresses this question 
for a medium-sized nation with a very open economy: The Nether- 
lands. Its author, Dr. Pieter de Wolff, is Chairman of the Dutch 
Central Committee of Statistics, Vice-Chairman of the Advisory 
Council for Science Policy of the Netherlands Government, and 
member of the Social Economic Council of the Netherlands. From 
1957 to 1966, he was Director of the Netherland's Central Planning 
Bureau. 
Roger E. Levien 
Director 
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INTRODUCTION 
Industrial change is by no means a new phenomenon. Ever since 
the beginning of the industrial revolution important changes 
have taken place. The post-war period is perhaps the most out- 
standing example in this respect. Many new products appeared 
on the markets. Production processes were strongly improved 
leading to rapidly rising productivity and an unprecedented 
rise of material well-being in many countries. 
During the seventies a growing awareness developed about 
the consequences of ongoing technological developments on the 
environment and on the threatening depletion of the resources of 
raw materials, in particular oil. "The Limits of Growth" 
published by the Club of Rome in 1972 was a typical exponent of 
this concern. In many circles in the Western world the possi- 
bility as well as the desirability of continuing growth in the 
traditional sense were questioned. 
This process of reassessing economic targets was reinforced 
by the growing competition of several developing countries which 
strongly affected the labor intensive industries in the developed 
countries. Although this is a desirable phenomenon per set as 
it is an essential condition for growth in the less developed 
countries, it became particularly painful after the oil crisis 
when growth rates in many industrially advanced countries became 
too low to provide jobs for those which were lost due to the 
competition of the low wage countries. 
These developments strengthened the perception that the 
Western world had to restructure its economy by developing and 
stimulating those activities in which it had or could attain 
advantageous positions, obviously within the framework of the 
constraints set by new economic and social targets. 
Moreover, the increasing oil price itself called for 
structural chanqes directed to an accelerated restriction of the 
use of oil, through savings as well as through the transition 
to other sources of energy (coal, nuclear, renewables). 
Obviously, the required industrial change has to be based 
on a well considered exploitation of national resources. This 
can be achieved in different ways such as by a more sophisticated 
refinement of advantages of site, improving productivity and 
innovation throughout the whole productive apparatus, and, above 
all, by exploiting human resources through increased attention 
to R&D. 
Governments aware of the necessity of restructuring tried 
and continuously try to cope with the ensuing problems of 
investment, risks, lack of information, etb., through a variety 
of policies. In centrally planned economies this might be done 
by directly interfering with the economic processes. In the 
Western countries,where freedom of entrepreneurship forms a basic 
element of the economic order,this can only be done by policies 
stimulating desirable developments and at the same time satis- 
fying constraints resulting from the desirability of attaining 
other aimstsuch as the protection of the environment, improving 
working conditions of the labor force, enhancing regional 
developments, etc. 
A large and widely varying set of governmental policies, 
differing from country to country, has been developed or is still 
in the process of being designed to promote efficient industrial 
change. 
The main categories can be summed up as follows: 
1. Financial support to high technology sectors; aerospace, 
nuclear, electronics, chemicals, computers. In France, 
Germany and the U.K. they comprise up to 80% of total 
governmental support of innovation. 
2. Stimuli resulting from a well designed govermental purchasing 
policy. This is particularly important for the bigger 
countries. 
3. Promoting R&D carried out by universities, research insti- 
tutes and firms. 
4. General financial support, investment incentives, subsidies, 
credit facilities. 
5. Special policies to support small and medium sized firms. 
Stimuli to the quaternary sector. 
The Netherlands' government is also actively involved in 
applying policies to enhance adequate industrial change throucjh 
a series of measures. However, before describing these in some 
detail, a few facts about the Dutch economy will be presented. 
2. SOME FACTS ABOUT THE NETHERLANDS 
The Netherlands is a small, rapidly growing and densely 
populated country with an area of about 37,000 km2. Population 
almost trebled during the twentieth century; it rose from 5.1 m. 
in 1900 to 14.1 in 1980, i.e. on average by 1% p.a., although 
in recent years this rate has dropped to .8%. At present the 
density is 382/km2. 
The rate of participation in the labor force is low, viz. 
37% for the population as a whole, mainly due to the still low 
share of married women (cf. Table 1). 
The educational level is fairly high but natural resources 
are limited. Climate and soil are well suited to cattle far- 
ming., agriculture and horticulture. The country is very well 
situated for international transport. However, it is poor in 
raw materials. It has small oil deposits but large resources of 
natural gas. Developed coal deposits were of a poor quality and, 
therefore, mines were closed down after the discovery of the 
natural gas in the early sixties. Rich coal deposits are present, 
but at a depth yet unattainable under existing techniques. 
Finally, there are some deposits of sodium and magnesium salts. 
But, after all, industry is largely dependent on foreign raw 
materials and semi-finished products. 
The country has a very open economy. The value of both 
imports and exports is in the order of 50% of the G11P which 
at present is about 21,500 gld/cap. (10,70O$/cap.) 
It is the site of important multinationals (Akzo, Philips, 
Shell, Unilever) which play an important role in industrial 
production and particularly in exports. But trade and 
transportation are still very important as can be seen from the 
composition of the labor force (cf. Tables 2 and 3). 
The Netherlands came out of the War in a deplorable state 
and the second half of the forties was a period of reconstruction. 
Business was under strict governmental control to ensure an 
efficient use of the very scarce resources. A strict wage and 
price policy favored investments and exports and the Marshall 
aid was very helpful. 
In the early fifties the restrictive measures were 
gradually lifted and an expansion period started, largely borne 
by rapidly growing world trade and a continuing low cost level. 
Industrial growth was stimulated through favorable profits and 
special investment incentives. Unemployment decreased rapid- 
ly, also due to an effective emigration policy (cf. Table 1). 
GIJP in real terms increased on average by 4.6%. Industrial 
production rose by 6% p.a. The typical growth industries, the 
chemical industry, oil refineries, metallurgical and electrotech- 
nical industries reached even higher figures. 
The sixties started with a tense labor market partly 
eased by a gradually increasing import of foreign labor. The 
incomes policy of the previous period lost much of its influence; 
wages rose strongly, also in real terms. Economic development 
was heavily stimulated by the discovery of a huge deposit of 
natural gas in 1962,which was rapidly developed. The use of 
gas penetrated private consumption and industry at a high rate 
(cf. Table 4). Moreover, it had a positive influence on the 
trade balance as roughly half of the increasing production was 
exported. It also strengthened the state budget as the lion's 
share of the proceeds flowed into the treasury. 
GNP rose by 5.9% p.a. and this resulted not only in a 
considerable increase in real incomes but also in heavy claims 
on public expenditure. This led to increased taxes but still 
more so to a steep rise in social security expenditures 
(financed through premiums paid by entrepreneurs and workers). 
This fast growth of collective expenditures (cf. Graph 1) 
gradually eroded the profit situation although the balance of 
payments on current account remained positive, in part due to 
the export of gas. 
Already in the beginning of the seventies signs of a world 
wide weakening of the economic situation became clear,but the 
situation changed drastically after the upsurge of oil prices in 
1973. 
In the Netherlands the level of activity was affected first. 
Exports grew more slowly, GNP increased only moderately and less 
than productivity, leading to increasing unemployment. For some 
time the balance of payments remained positive and this in turn 
put a strong upward pressure on the guilder when exchange rates 
started to float. This had a dampening effect on inflation but, 
nevertheless, adversely affected the competitive position. In 
particular as labor costs remained high, both in comparison 
to levels in other W. European countries as well as in relation to 
its share in the GNP (cf. Table 5). Moreover, due to the rather 
high energy content of the export products the impact of the 
rising oil prices was heavily felt. 
Since 1978 the balance of payments is negative and at 
present the prospects for growth are very low and the consequen- 
ces for the employment situation are rather gloomy. 
These developments are aggravated by the fact that the 
production of natural gas will be diminished in the coming 
years in order to avoid a too rapid depletion of the resources, 
which will increase the pressure on the balance of payments. 
From the preceding description it will be evident that it is 
of paramount importance to stimulate processes that can contri- 
bute to a reinforcement of the Dutch economy. 
3. POLICIES FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE NETHERLANDS 
3.1 The years 1977 - 1979 
Policies aimed at structural change of various forms have 
been applied ever since the end of the Second World War. The 
investment incentives mentioned in 2 can be interpreted as such. 
The same is true for measures stimulating industrial development 
in the province of Limburg in order to alleviate the unemployment 
problems caused by the closing of the coal mines and several 
others could be added. 
An interesting instrument of this kind is the so-called 
"Law for Rules on Selective Investments" (S.I.R.), enacted in 
1975 and intended to counteract the crowding of industrial 
activities in the Western part of the country, in particular 
in the Rhine estuary (the region around Rotterdam). Investments 
in the latter area became subject to authorisation andtin addition, 
to a levy of 10%; in the remaining part of the S.I.R. region 
only reporting is required and levies are lower. This law is 
still in the books and in particular during the boom period it 
was reasonably effective. 
However, the difficulties caused by the 1973 oil crisis, the 
weakness of certain parts of our industry and the growing compe- 
tion of foreign countries required a more fundamental approach 
and an important step in'this direction was set with the 1976 
"Govermental Paper on Selective Growth". Its aim was to design 
policies leading to and maintaining full employment within the 
framework of so-called facets (hence the term "selective"), viz. 
environmental protection, regional development, efficient use of 
energy and raw r.aterials, reinforcing the infrastructure and, finally, 
taking into account the consequences of the necessary growth process 
in the developing countries. 
The paper rejected the idea of a blue print for industrial 
development and even the possibility of ordering productive 
sectors in accordance with the way they would fit the aims. Due 
to the complexity of inter-industrial relations, the widely 
varying share of exports in the output of different sectors, the 
differences in earning power between sectors, etc. it was felt 
to be impossible to allocate appropriate weights to the sectors. 
Therefore, a more flexible additional program was set up. 
Based on a study by the Central Planning Bureau on the macro- 
effects of various possible measures (cf. Table 6), it was 
decided to allocate some 70% of the assigned annual budget to 
investment premiums and the remainder to subsidies on wages and 
social security premiums. It was estimated that this program 
would reduce unemployment by 60,000 in 1980. Moreover, itwas 
decided to evaluate the program at certain intervals. 
In addition to this program,several other important 
measures were taken. 
A new "Law on Investment Accountsg* (W.I.R.) was proposed 
to replace the traditional system of investment deductions,which 
allowed a certain percentage of investment costs to be set off 
against profits by a system of subsidies (irrespective of 
profits being made) differentiated according to facet criteria. 
This law intending to increase the power of the government to 
steer the economy was enacted in 1978. During the transition 
period, the effect of the existing system was reinforced by in- 
creasing the deduction for building from 8% in each of two con- 
secutive years to 12% and, for other fixed assets from two times 
4% to two times 8%. 
The multi-annual budgets for 1977 - 1980 contained already 
substantial provisions for strueural improvements of industrial 
sectors, technological improvements and regional policies 
(including support to individual firms), viz. of the order of 400 m. 
gld. p.a. It was decided to raise these amounts by sums rising 
from 500 to 700 m. gld. 
In order to improve the functioning of the labor market 
agencies and to get a better adaptation of the supply of labor 
to the demand, amounts varying from 200 to 230 m. gld. were made 
available for increasing labor mobility, improving labor conditions 
and, to alleviate the social consequences of the restructuring 
process. 
Facilities for expozt credits were increased; the existing 
fund for this purpose was raised from .8 to 1.5 b. gld. 
Moreover, in view of the disappointing development of inter- 
national agreements about untied aid to less developed countries, 
steps were taken to arrive at bilateral arrangements. 
The organizational side of restructuring industry also 
got much attention. Extensive sectoral investigations were 
carried out, statistical information was improved and the 
Netherlands' Reconstruction Foundation, already set up in 1972, 
was charged with the preparation of the measures to be taken. 
In particular emphasis was put on increasing the efficiency of 
the R&D effort and to promoting activities (so-called SFear- 
heads), such as energy projects, studies about a second inter- 
national airport, etc.) . 
Three years passed until the new program took shape,but 
before making some remarks about its evaluation, a more detailed 
description will be given of the W.I.R. which, as has already 
been said, became effective during the period under consideration. 
It was the intention of the government to design an instru- 
ment for a selective investment policy and, therefore, the law 
contains a set of precisely stipulated conditions for granting 
subsidies of different types. The legal form was chosen to 
provide clarity and security to future investors. In first 
instance the following facilities were offered: 
1) a basic premium differentiated according to sectors 
(23% for building and varying from 12 to 15% for other 
types) and still subject to the S.I.R. restrictions. 
a small scale allowance of 6% for very small invest- 
ments and linearly decreasing to zero for investments 
of 800,000 gld. and over. 
a regional development allowance to be seen as an 
additional incentive to move activities from the S.I.R. 
area to so-called growth points in other parts of the 
country, again differentiated between building (15%) 
and other types of fixed assets (735%) . 
4) a special regional development allowance reserved for 
depressed areas (with high unemployment) for which 
the subsidies sub 3)will be increased by one third. 
5) an allowance for large projects, viz. those over 30 m. 
gld., based on the estimated employment created by the 
project and only for the fraction by which the costs 
surpassed the limit of 30 m. 
In order to avoid an accumulation of subsidies to an un- 
desirably high level, maxima are built in of 50% for building 
and of 25% for other investments. Moreover, due to E.E.C 
regulationsfregional subsidies are also subject to certain 
upper limits. 
An evaluation of the program remains very difficult as it is 
almost impossible to disentangle the various factors involved. 
In the first place, economic development has been strong- 
ly affected by the disappointing development of external for- 
ces; viz. the growth of world trade and the fierce competition 
not only from the developing countries but also from E.E.C. 
partners and the U.S., caused by our high cost level and the 
strong position of the guilder. Hence the economic growth 
was much less than expected (cf. Table 7). Moreover, as a 
consequence, several firms got into difficulties and therefore 
a considerable part of the funds had to be spent on support 
to insolvent firms and, hence, the program became more defensive 
and less promotional than intended. 
Organizational difficulties also arose. In several instan- 
ces, e.g., the N'.E.H.E.M. did not succeed in harmonizing the 
conflicting opinions of entrepreneurs and trade unions about the 
sector goals or to overcome the fear of the stronger firms of a 
sector for unfair competition resulting from support to the 
weaker ones. 
However, some information is available on the direct support 
to firms. Roughly 2.2 b. gld. has been spent on such programs, 
affecting firms employing 130,000 persons. Of this amount .9 
b. gld. refers to big firms and to approximately 61,000 jobs 
for which the results are still rather uncertain. The following 
table gives some indications for the smaller firms. 
Evaluation of t h e  d i r e c t  support  t o  f i rms  
In  terms of expenditures  number of jobs number of e n t e r p r i s e s  
success fu l  49% 
doubtful  36% 
f a i l u r e  15% 
The r e s u l t s  d i f f e r  considerably from s e c t o r  t o  s e c t o r .  The 
percentage of success fu l  ope ra t ions ,  measured by jobs,  va r i ed  
from 30% f o r  t h e  metal  indus t ry  through 38% f o r  t e x t i l e s  and 
70% f o r  food t o  98% f o r  t h e  chemical indus t ry .  
Summarizing t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  t o t a l  program, it i s  obvious 
t h a t ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  goal  f o r  unemployment has no t  been 
reached. But it i s  perhaps j u s t i f i e d  t o  say t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
without i t s  support  would have been s t i l l  less favorable .  
3.2 Recent developments 
The r e s u l t s  mentioned i n  t h e  previous s e c t i o n  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
more extens ive  a c t i o n  would be needed t o  cope with t h e  d i f f i c u l -  
ties. To t h i s  end, i n  t h e  autumn of 1979 two important govern- 
mental papers  have been i s s u e d ,  v i z .  t h e  "Progress Report on 
Economic S t r u c t u r e  Pol icy" ( i n  September) and t h e  "Innovation 
Paper" (October) . 
In  t h e  f i r s t  one t h e  p resen t  government endorses  t h e  pr in-  
c i p l e s  o u t l i n e d  i n  t h e  1976 paper ,  but  recognizing t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  p o l i c i e s  pursued, perhaps un in ten t iona l ly  had g o t  a s t rong  
"micro" c h a r a c t e r  (i .e. d i r e c t e d  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  f i rms)  , i n  a num- 
ber  of cases  leading  only t o  postponing an unavoidable bankruptcy, 
it decided i n  f u t u r e  t o  d i r e c t  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  mainly t o  t h e  so  
c a l l e d  "meso" . l e v e l  ( i .e.  t o  e n t i r e  s e c t o r s  of t h e  economy). 
In  i t s  opinion t h e  micro po l i cy  could e a s i l y  l ead  t o  u n f a i r  
competit ion,  t o  undermining i n d i v i d u a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and obstruc-  
t i n g  an e f f e c t i v e  funct ioning  of t h e  free-market p r i n c i p l e .  
The meso pol icy  would be a more e f f i c i e n t  t o o l  t o  adapt  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  Dutch economy t o  t h e  condi t ions  imposed by 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  developments. Moreover, it would enable  en t re -  
preneurs  t o  formulate t h e i r  own p o l i c i e s  i n  accordance wi th  t h e  
s e c t o r a l  out look;  it would improve t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of a n t i c i -  
pa t ing  new developments; y i e l d  b e t t e r  information about t h e  
e f f e c t s  on t h e  s e c t o r  of s p e c i a l  f a c e t  programs and, f i n a l l y ,  
inc rease  t h e  c l a r i t y  and t h e  s e c u r i t y  of governmental programs. 
Henceforward t h e r e f o r e ,  indiykdual  support  w i l l  be r e s t r i c t e d  
t o  a l i m i t e d  number of c a s e s ,  v i z .  t o  a r e a s  with excep t iona l ly  
high unemployment and t o  very b i g  f i rms.  During t h e  coming 
four  years  t h e  corresponding means w i l l  gradual ly  decrease  from 
110 m. gld.  t o  30 m. gld .  p.a. 
With re spec t  t o  t h e  meso po l i cy  two d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s  
have been d i s t ingu i shed ,  v iz .  so-called simple cases  and mul t ip le  
ones. 
The f i r s t  one r e f e r s  t o  cases  where only one important prob- 
l e m  has t o  be solved,  e.g.  in t roduc t ion  of recycl ing  t o  save 
raw materials, acquisition of information about important new 
technological developments, improving export promotion, removing 
bottlenecks for the introduction of retraining programs, etc. 
In such cases support can be obtained subject to a set of well 
defined conditions, to the willingness of entrepreneurs to 
bear themselves a sizeable fraction of the cost of the program 
and for a restricted period. This type of support can go up to 
a maximum of 20% of the total cost involved (25% if facet aspects 
play a role). 
The second category covers cases where a more fundamental 
reconstruction is required, viz. those with on the whole a too 
low earning power, with low expectations about possible future 
improvements and often with serious over-capacities. In these 
cases the government will be helpful in setting up sector 
committees (on a voluntary basis) where experts from institutes 
of technology, private firms, etc., will investigate and advise 
on measures to be taken to solve the problem. The government 
will then be prepared to participate in the costs, provided a 
large part of the firms involved is willing to cooperate. 
If it turns out that the necessary reconstruction can only 
be achieved through a considerable reduction in size of the 
sector with an unavoidable loss of jobs, due attention will also 
be paid to the social consequences of the adaptation. In a 
number of cases sector committees are already at work. 
The restructuring foundation N.E.H.E.M. is assigned an 
important role in the execution of the program and to this end 
its structure which in the past led to difficulties will be 
adapted. Moreover, it will work closely with existing organi- 
zations in the field of small and medium sized firms (SME) to 
ensure that these firms will also be able to profit from the 
benefits which may be derived from the policies envisaged. 
Considerable means are provided for these purposes, viz. 
1.4 b. gld. for each of the years 1980 to 1984, which represents 
a considerable extension of the previous program. 
Special attention will be given to increasing the possi- 
bilities offered by the W.I.R. Additional subsidies for 
energy saving investments have already been incorporated. The 
possibility of subsidies for job creating activities, which 
are much more difficult to implement, are still under conside- 
ration. 
3.3 The innovation paper 
Whereas the papers described in the previous sectors deal 
with restructuring policies in general, the innovation paper is 
devoted to policies specifically intended to promote innovative 
activities. It is generally felt that in order to be able to 
maintain our present level of prosperity it will be necessary to 
make more efficient use of our human resources through specializing 
in the production of know-how intensive goods and services. We 
will have to anticipate technological developments and to match 
what is going on in these fields abroad in order to improve our 
competitive position with respect to the other highly industria- 
lized countries. The necessity to be alert on this aspect is all 
the more important as a recent investigation has shown that since 
1976 the share of know-how intensive products in our exports is , 
declining. The government wants to play an important role in 
stimulating innovation and in removing possible bottlenecks, in 
particular through increased attention to RtD. 
The Netherlands spends a considerable amount of money on 
RtD, viz. about 2% of its GNP (cf. Table 8) and is, in this res- 
pect,in line with most other industrialized countries. 
In accordance with the general cost level, R&D costs are 
relatively high as is shown by the following figures for 1975 
borrowed from an O.E.C.D. publication. 
RtD costs per worker 
Sweden Netherlands W.Germany France U.R. Japan 
103 100 86 80 47 46 
In recent years these differences may have become smaller,but 
they have not disappeared. 
Some 55% of the total is financed by enterprises, the re- 
mainder from public funds. About 70% of the private funds is 
spent by the five big multinationals and the effort of smaller 
firms in general is rather modest. In this respect they lag 
behind their counterparts in some other small countries like 
Denmark and Israel. 
A little bit less than one half of public funds is spent on 
research in universities and institutes of technology, over one 
half goes to various research institutes (like the National 
Air Traffic Laboratory, the Energy Center Netherlands (E.C.N.) 
and, in particular T.N.O., the center for technical and scientific 
research which runs a considerable number of specific research 
institutes). In contrast to the situation in many other countries, 
a very small percentage of public expenditures on R&D is directly 
granted to individual firms as may be seen from the following 
figures : 
Share direct subsidies to firms the public outlay on R&D 
U.S. (1975) U.K. (1973) France (1974) W. Germany (1970) 
Netherlands (1978) 
5% 
There are, however, a few sectors where governmental support has 
been both important and very successful, e.g. in agriculture, in 
water works and in aircraft development. 
In analyzing the factors influencing innovation the paper 
identifies two fundamental concepts. Technological trajectories, 
i.e. technical and scientific currents which during a certain 
period set the trend of the development (economies of scale, 
substitution of natural raw materials, miniaturization, etc.) 
The selecting environment, viz. the acceptance of innovations 
by the market, effects of the socio-economic climate, effects of 
governmental policies, etc. The distinction between these two 
tendencies is not very sharp and they often influence each other. 
Still, this distinction is considered to be more useful than the 
traditional one of technology push and demand pull. 
The main policy lines are the following: 
1) Stimulating innovation by individual firms which is badly 
needed in order to reinforce the weakened competitive position. 
2) Reinforcing the role of the R&D infrastructure, in particular 
by supporting the growing cooperation between the (semi) govern- 
mental R&D potential of institutes of technology, universities 
and research institutes. 
3) Reinforcing advisory and informative services focusing on 
innovative activities in particular for the benefit of small 
and medium-sized firms. 
4 )  Improving technological innovation in the "facet" areas 
(energy, environment, etc.) and putting more emphasis on the 
instruments of governmental purchasing power and regulations. 
The choice of these themes is partly inspired by national experience. 
and partly based on forei n examples. The strong attention given 
to the SME Lnot only in 39 is based on the conviction that they 
will have to play a very important role in the restructuring 
process; not only because they have shown a much greater resistance 
to the negative influences of the economic trend in recent years 
but also because of their innovative power. In this respect 
reference is made to the successful experience in the U.S. of the 
Small Business Investment Corporations and also to the results 
presented in the study "Six Countries Program on Aspects of 
Governmental Policies towards Technological Innovation in Industry". 
The policy measures can be grouped under four headings: 
I The "cost line". 
This part of the program includes subsidies for R&D, in particular 
for SME or groups of such firms; financial support to 
commissions by firms to investigate innovative possibilities; 
support for acquiring licences and patents. The subsidies will 
be subject to maxima to make sure that SME will derive the 
largest part of the benefits of this part of the program. 
Guidance of innovation projects will also be brought under this 
heading. This is an extension of a program which already exists 
on a small scale and which has been successful. It refers to 
cases where the government grants bear the cost of technical 
and commercial advice to a firm or a group of firms engaged in 
a f e a s i b i l i t y  study on a promising innovative idea .  
I1 The " r i s k  l i n e " .  
This p a r t  r e f e r s  t o  two d i f f e r e n t  types of measures, v i z :  
A subs t an t i a l  increase  of t he  budget f o r  development c r e d i t s  
t o  SME and, Introduction of a  new budget f o r  development 
c r e d i t s  t o  b ig  f i rms f o r  supporting new a t t r a c t i v e  p ro j ec t s  
of g r ea t  importance bu t  incur r ing  heavy r i s k s  t o  be borne 
by individual  en t e rp r i s e s .  
I11 The R&D i n f r a s t ruc tu re .  
In  t h i s  category a l a rge  number of a c t i v i t i e s  has been envisaged. 
The most important ones w i l l  be described b r i e f l y :  
a )  Research programs aiming a t  innovation w i l l  be developed. 
To t h i s  end program committees w i l l  be set up i n  which 
represen ta t ives  of p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n s t i t u t e s  (from uni- 
v e r s i t i e s  and i n s t i t u t e s  of technology) a s  w e l l  a s  u se r s  
w i l l  be members. Their t a sk  w i l l  be the  s e l ec t i on  of 
promising p ro j ec t s ,  t o  promote t h e  execution and evaluate  
t he  progress of t h e  a c t i v i t i e s .  Modest f i nanc i a l  means 
a r e  made ava i l ab l e  t o  s t a r t  such p ro j ec t s ,  but  i n  t he  
course of t i m e  t h e i r  f inancing w i l l  have t o  be incorporated 
i n t o  t h e  normal budgets of t he  i n s t i t u t e s .  ' 
The following a reas  have been se lec ted  f o r  the  f i r s t  
experiments i n  t h i s  f i e l d :  chemistry and chemical tech- 
nology, biotechnology, bui lding,  production technics  of 
t h e  metal indus t ry  and microelectronics and informatics .  
Support w i l l  be provided by t he  r e s u l t s  of so-called 
exploratory committees which have been i n s t i t u t e d  i n  
c e r t a i n  f i e l d s  of research i n  order  t o  map t h e  ongoing 
s tud i e s  and t o  s e l e c t  s t rong points .  The repor t  of t h e  
committee f o r  chemistry i s  already ava i lab le  and i s  being 
used f o r  t h i s  purpose. 
b) The reprograming of ex i s t i ng  research i n s t i t u t e s  w i l l  be 
st imulated.  This r e f e r s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t o  t h e  work done 
by the  Energy Center Netherlands (E .C .N . )  and by t he  
i n s t i t u t e s  con t ro l l ed  by T.N.O. Their research programs 
w i l l  consequently be adapted t o  requirements of t he  chan- 
ging technological  s i t ua t i on .  Due a t t en t i on  w i l l  a l s o  
be given t o  inves t iga t ions  i n t o  t he  s o c i a l  consequences 
of the  changes. 
C )  Steps w i l l  be taken t o  meet t he  rapid  rise of micro- 
e l ec t ron i c s .  These cons i s t  of spreading information t o  
employers, t r ade  unions and other  groupings i n  soc ie ty ;  
adapted r e t r a i n i n g  schemes, f i nanc i a l  support t o  individual  
firms t o  r e s t r i c t  t he  r i s k s  of very promising p ro j ec t s  
( p a r t  of t he  " r i s k  l i n e "  a c t i v i t i e s ) ,  f i nanc i a l  support 
t o  firms o r  groups of firms t o  share t he  cos t  of advice 
on the  app l ica t ions  of microelectronics and promoting 
cooperation between research i n s t i t u t e s  and firms i n  
order  t o  c r ea t e  app l ica t ions  f o r  SME. Special  a t t e n t i o n  
w i l l  be given t o  what ex ten t  Dutch indust ry  might p r o f i t  
from the  know-how of t he  Ph i l i p s  f a c t o r i e s ,  a  leading 
firm in the production of integrated circuits and their 
industrial uses. 
d) The scope of Z.W.O., the Foundation for Pure Scientific 
Research,will be extended. This foundation contributes 
to the financing of first-class research of public insti- 
tutes and institutes of higher learning from a budget 
annually put at its disposal by the Minister of Science 
and Education. In the past according to its statute 
it had to restrict its activities to pure scientific 
research. Now it will also be able to support high- 
level applied research. Its budget will be increased 
accordingly. 
e) T.N.O. is in the process of reconstruction. In the course 
of time it developed into four big entities for research 
in the fields of industry, food, health and defense, 
loosely coupled together under the umbrella of a central 
organization. The management becomes more centralized 
and in this process special attention will be given to 
the interface between the results of the research and 
their application to the innovation process of the 
individual firms. The transfer of know-how will be 
improved and a more active marketing policy will be 
pursued. The access of SME to the organization will be 
facilitated. Among the many measures which will be 
taken to realize these aims, mention may be made of the 
institution within T.M.O. of an industrial service 
center and of shifting part of the governmental subsidy 
(which forms a considerable part of the total income of 
T.N.O.) to customer-contracted commissions. The 
transfer of technology will also be facilitated through 
the institution of so-called transfer points in which 
T.N.O. is cooperating with institutes of technology, 
a development which is already well on its way. 
Governmental purchasing policy and side-effects of governmental 
regulations in general. 
In general the purchasing policy of the Dutch public authori- 
ties has been aimed at an economical use of public money and, 
hence, to strive for the lowest bid irrespective of this being 
of national or of foreign origin. On the other hand it is 
generally recognized that a well designed purchasing policy 
can have very favorable stimulating influences on industrial 
development, even though the effect will be the more important 
the bigger the country. Nevertheless, the Dutch government 
feels that even in a small country a shift in policy from 
trying to fulfill precisely stipulated needs at short notice 
to one that also takes into account longer term effects may be 
an efficient tool for promoting innovation. It is not easy 
to carry through such a change in policy overnight,but the 
governmental purchasing agency has been authorized with the 
help of experts to make purchasing officials of the various 
ministries aware of the ways in which they might stimulate 
innovation. These efforts will also be extended to the lower 
authorities. An interdepartmental committee has recommended 
a list of areas in which a well considered policy could be 
very effective. 
What has been said about purchasing policy is to a certain 
extent also pertinent to the effects of official regulations in 
general. To give an example, the Netherlands as a highly industria- 
lized and densely populated country has to be in the forefront of 
environment protection measures. Usually such measures are a 
burden to industry, but the government can also stimulate the 
development of appropriate protection techniques and in this way 
contribute to a positive spin-off. In future, systematic attention 
will be given to developments of this kind. 
The various aspects of the innovation program spelled out, 
above indicate that it is a somewhat ambitious one. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that its elaboration will require con- 
siderable national means. Table 9 gives some information about 
their size during the period for which the program is intended, 
as well as for the share of the various items in the total. 
Graph 2 shows that the program will lead to a drastic change in 
the size of the governmental R&D effort outside the institutes 
of higher learning. 
In addition, it may be added that the active cooperation of 
all persons concerned will be required to ensure a successful 
relization of a program that will form a corner stone in the 
total set of policies which have to be developed in order to be 
able to meet the challenges the Netherlands has to face in a 
changing world. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
Ar.a: 36.948 km2 = 14.272 s q .  miles  
-
Populat ion i n  m i l l .  on J a n .  1 s t .  
5.1 5.9 6.8 7.8 8.8 10.0 11.4 13.0 14.1 
Annual 
i n c r e a s e  
i n  1.39 1.55 1.38 1.21 1.27 1.31 1.27 0.31 
Dens i ty :  382/ lkm2 = 988/ sq .mile ( J a n  .Is t ,  1980) 
Economically a c t i v e  populat ion [ 1978) 
Age . . Men \'Jam en T o t a l  
1000 ' 3 % 1 0 o o n i  g l )  1000's  % 1) 
15 - 24 60 3 49 09 552 47 -6 1155 45 a7 
25 - 49 2282 95 -1 763 33 -6 3045 65.2 
50 - 64 7 40 77.1 184 17.6 924 46.1 
65+ 34 5 03 9 1 00 43 2.8 
T o t a l  3659 70.2 1508 28 .!, 5167 45.8 
1) percentage of  t o t a l  aga group 
Miara t i o n  
Annual averages  
Immigration 54,784 80,074 105,108 
Emigration 54,868 60,754 58,730 
Sa lance  - 84 19,320 46,378 22,843 
Table  2 
Labour f o r c e  ( i n  1000 manyears) 
S e c t o r  1965 1977 
A g r i c u l t u r e  and f i s h i n g  388 8  .6 289 5  .9 
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  (and  m i n i n g )  1381  ( 5 0 )  30.4 1 0 2 2 ( - )  21.0 
P u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s  42 0  .9 45 0  .9 
C o n s t r u c t i o n  and a l l i e d  i n d  464 10  .2 446 9  .I 
Trade, r e s t . ,  h o t e l s ,  r e p a i r  746 16.4 916 18 .7 
T r a n s p o r t ,  s t o r a g e  and comm . 304 6  .7 310 6  .4 
0  t h e r  s e r v i c e s  661  14.6 962 19.7 
E n t e r p r i s e s ,  t o t a l  3986 87 .8 3990 81.8 
Government ( c e n t r a l  - and 
l o w e r  a u t h o r i t i e s  ) 516 11 .4 668 13.7 
R e g i s t e r e d  unsnp loyed  36 0.8 218 4.5 
Grand t o t a l  
Average annua l  grovrth 
E s t i m a t e d  ann . grovrth 
i n  the 8 0 ' i e s  
Labour  f o r c e  as a  percen-  
taae o f  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  
Tabls 3 
GNP 
Foreiqn t rade  i n  r e l a t i o n  to GNP 
1960 1970 1978 
b i l l .  b i l l .  b i l l .  
g l d .  76 GI l d  w 10 g l d .  CI , 3 
42.30 100 06 115.11 100 00 282 045 100 .o 
Imports 
Comrnodi t i e s  17 063 41.7 49 014 42.7 117 .OO 41 .4 
Serv ices  2.71 6 .4 7 003 6.1 17.45 6 .2 
P r i m .  incomes 1.03 2 .4 4.17 3 .6 11 .35 4 .2 
Tota l  21  .37 50.5 60.34 52.4 146.40 51.8 
Exports 
Comaodi t i e s  
Serv ices  
P r i m .  incomes 
Tota l  22.46 53.5 53 .79 51.1 145.80 51.6 ( 
3alance of pay- 
ment ( c u r r .  acc .) 1.27 
Table  4 
T r a n s i t i o n  t o  n a t u r a l  ga s  
Eneray use  of  Dutch e n t e r p r i s e s  ( i n  % of t o t a l )  
Coal  Fl inera l  o i l  N a t u r a l  ga s  T o t a l  
Tab le  5 
I i t e r n a t i o n a l  comparison of  l a b o u r  c o s t s  ( o c t .  1977)  
Ne the r l ands  = 100 
W .  Germany 
All , e n t e r p r i s e s  87 
of which: 
t e x t i l e s  8 3  
chemica l  and rubbe r  86  
b a s i c  me ta l s  8 4  
meta l  i n d u s  t r y  95  
e l e c  t r o t e c h n ,  i n d u s t r y  78 
prod.  of means of t r a n s p .  100 
France E .E .C . 
69 7 4  
i n c l  . of s o c i a l  s e c u  ti t y  premiums paid by en t e  rpreneu rs ; 
weighted acco rd ing  t o  t he  Dutch employment p a t t e r n  
Vlaqe c o s t s  p e r  hour  ( n a t i o n a l  a v e r a g e s )  (Oc t .  1977)  
W.Ge France Neth.  B e l a .  Lux. U.K. Denm. 
DM FR . FL Fii FR 2 I<R 
Nat. c u r r .  20.50 33.70 24,60 337 346 2.20 49.90 
E u r .  U n i t s  
of a ccoun t  7.80 6.00 8.80 8.20 8.50 3.40 7.10 
Neth. = 100 89  58 100 9 3  97 39 8 1  
Sha re  of l a b o u r  c o s t s  i n  "5 of Nr.11 1 1 
1) e x c l .  of mining ( i n  l a t e r  y e a r s  mainly  p roduc t ion  of n a t u r a l  g a s ) ,  
p u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s  and e x p l o i t a t i o n  of d w e l l i n g s  
2 )  p r e l i m i n a r y  
T a b l e  6 
Es t i m a  t d d  s f  f e c t  o f  d i f  f c r ? n t  p o l i c y  measures, 
each r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  1:s i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
d e f i c i t  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  b u d g e t  d u r i n g  1977 - 1980 
(5ased  on c o m p u t a t i o n s  b y  t h e  C e n t r a l   plan^ ng B u r e a u )  
S i z e  o f  measure on 
a n n u a l  b a s i s  
I n c  r s a s e  o f  i n v e s t -  
ments b y  .696 o f  GNP 
Wage s u b s i d i e s  
.%A o f  t o t a l  wage b i l l  
R e d u c t i o n  o f  d i r e c t  
t a x e s  b y  .4% o f  GNP 
R e d u c t i o n  o f  i n d i r e c t  
t a x e s  b y  .42% o f  GNP 
I n c r e a s e d  governnen t a l  
s p e n d i n g  by .59@5 o f  GNP 
E f f e c t  i n  1980 on 
Enploymen t Consumer p r i c e  l e v e l  
( 1 0 0 0 ' s )  ( 3  
T a b l e  7  
S e c t o r  
Volume o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  , 1973/ lM0 
( a n n u a l  i n c r e a s e s  i n  %) 
Ag r i c u l  t u  r e  
( i n c l .  o f  f i s h e r i e s )  
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  
c f  w h i c h :  
Energy  p roduc  t i o n  
C h e m i c a l  i n d u s t r y  
E l e c t r o t e c h n i c a l  
i n d u s t r y  
T e x t i l e  i n d u s  t r y  
B u i l d i n g  i n d u s t r y  
S e r v i c e s  
F o r e c a s t s  , end 1975 Recen t  e s t i m a t e s  
T o t a l  
L a b o u r  p roduc  t i ~ i  t y  
T a b l e  8 
4.  a 0. e x p e n d i t u r e s  a n d  p e r s o n n e l  
E x p e n d i t u r e s  ( m i l l .  g l d  .) 
E n t e r p r i s e s  
R e s e a r c h  i n s  t i  t u  tes  
o f  w h i c h  TNO 
U n i v e  rs i  t i e s  a n d  i n s t i t u t e s  
o f  t e c h n o l o q y  
( s c i e n c e )  
T o t a l  
T o t a l  i n  % o f  GNP 
P e r s o n n e l  c o s t s  
Mate r i a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  
I n v e s  t n e n  ts 
T o t a l  
P e r s o n n e l  ( 1 0 0 0  m a n y e a r s  ) 
E n t e r p r i s e s  
R e s e a r c h  i n s  t i  t u  t e s  
U n i v e r s i t i e s  a n d  i n s  t i  t u  t e s  
o f  t e c h n o l o g y  
T o t a l  
U n i v e r s i t y  g r a d u a t e s  
O t h e r  p e r s o n n e l  
T a b l e  9  
P l a n n z d  qove rnnen  t a l  e z p e n d i  t u r e s  f o r  
t h e  i n n o v a t i o n  proaram, 1990 - 1994 ( m i l l .  g l d . )  
1980 1 9 8 1  1982 1983 1984 
C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  R .&D . -ccs t s  
R .&D/cos t s  o f  f i r m s  (wages,  109.9 155.1  158.1 161.4 16.4.5 
~ o ~ ~ ~ i s s i o n s ,  l i c e n c e s ,  p a t e n t s )  (152.8)  (155.9)  (158.3) (162.0)  (165.7)  
T o t a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  c o s t s  117.8 167 07 173 m5 177 e6 181.0 (163.3) (169.2)  (175.0)  (178.3) (182.2)  
C o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  r i s k  b e a r i n q  
p r o j e c t s  
A d d i t i o n a l  deve lopment  c r e d i t s  2  .O 3  88 5  .7 7  86 9  .5 
t o  s m a l l  and medium s i z e d  f i r n s  (10.5)  (10 .6)  (10.7)  (10.9)  (11 .0)  
Deve lopment  c r e d i t s  t o  
l a r g e  f i r m s  
T o t a l  r i s k  5 e a r i n g  p r o j e c t s  
C o n t r i b u t i o n s  ( a d d i t i o n a l )  
t o  i n  t r a s  t r u c  t u  r a l  t y p e s  
o f  R .&D;-ac t i v i  t i e s  
Grand t o t a l  
F i g u r e s  r e f e r  t o  - t i m a t e d  a c t u a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  f i g u r e s  i n  p a r e n  t e s e s  
i n d i c a t e  u p p e r  l i m i t s  o f  conmi  t n e n  t s  
S h a r e  o f  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  the n e t  n a t i o n a l  i n c o v  
( m a r k e t  p r i c e s  ) 
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Graph I 
Graph 2 
I n d e x  
430 1 
D e f l a t e d  governmenta l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on R.& 0 .  
( e x c l .  o f  u n i v e r s i t i e s  and schoo l s  o f  techn .) 
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